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 How do  sensory experiences (or qualia) manage to combine with  concepts
to produce the rich human thinking we all enjoy? Obviously it happens, as 
for example when I form a perception of a yellow chair in which an experi-
ence of yellowness and a concept of ‘chairhood’ both participate. But the 
question of how exactly it happens seems worthy of philosophical reﬂ ection 
in that these two things seem crucially different from one another. They dif-
fer ﬁ rst in that sensory experiences enjoy a certain  felt immediacy or pres-
ence (that particular yellow, which I may or may not be able to express 
in words), while concepts participate in  wide-ranging logical relationships 
across an entire space of reasons (for instance that the yellow chair,  qua
chair, is not identical with any single electron in the Universe: actual or even 
potential). But the puzzle extends even further—sensory experiences and 
concepts seem possessed of  incompatible properties in that the former seem 
to enjoy a kind of ‘private’ infallibility, while judgments constructed from 
concepts are clearly truth-apt and fallible. Previously I have explicated this 
‘Experience-Truth Gap’ as follows: 
 On the one hand, my perceptions are suffused with immediately felt 
experience (for instance, the juicy, sweet ‘cherryness’ of a cherry I am 
biting into), which it seems that in some important sense ‘no-one can 
take away from me.’ Thus the nature of our sensory feels appears to 
enjoy some degree of infallibility. (‘Even if that cherry was a total hal-
lucination, I can’t be wrong about how it tasted to me.’) On the other 
hand, much of the point of perception seems to be to enable us to 
endorse new propositions about the world that are truth-apt. (‘This 
cherry is delicious! But is it really a cherry, or rather a small plum?’) 
In this regard our perceptions seem perfectly fallible. This is all rather 
confusing. 
 ( Legg 2017 , 42–3) 
 Insofar as this disparity does represent a tension in philosophy of percep-
tion, it obviously bleeds profusely into epistemology more generally. 
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 Sellars was far-sighted in his day in noting and highlighting this tension. 
He thought (rightly, I believe) that it was being quite overlooked by his 
empiricist contemporaries, including noted logical positivists such as Carnap 
and Ayer, leading to “perplexities . . . when one tries to think [empiricism] 
through” ( Sellars 1997 , §7, 25). He diagnosed the problem as lying with the 
peculiar infallibility attributed to sensory experience. He famously dubbed 
this the  Myth of the Given . But the Myth’s exact legacy, and in what way 
philosophers should best avoid it, if they should, is still being determined. 
 Important work here has been done by Sellars’s students—notably John 
McDowell. In McDowell (2004a, 2004b), he explored how sensibility and 
the understanding (or more poetically, following Kant,  receptivity and 
spontaneity ) combine to create human cognition that is subject to logical 
appraisal. In seeking to reconcile these two faculties, as he understood them, 
McDowell sought a middle way between the  bald naturalism that he argued 
results from over-reliance on receptivity and the ‘ frictionless coherentism ’ 
that he argued results from over-reliance on spontaneity. He argued that 
Sellars’s identiﬁ cation of the Myth led him to excessively deprecate the con-
tribution of sensory experience to human cognition, developing instead a 
purely conceptual epistemology (i.e., an inferentialism) which in McDow-
ell’s view falls into frictionless coherentism. Thus, McDowell charges Sel-
lars with failing to account for the primal confrontation between mind and 
world which constitutes genuine perception, and thus knowledge. But since 
then, McDowell has not been entirely satisﬁ ed with his appraisal of Sel-
lars. In  Having the World in View he has returned to the same ground and 
offered a somewhat different take, which I shall discuss below. 
 Robert Brandom has also done much to bring these issues to light (Bran-
dom 1994, 2000, 2007). His dogged defense of an  inferentialist as opposed 
to a  representationalist account of content—according to which the valid 
inferences into which a given proposition may enter constitute its entire 
meaning—has been (among other things) an attempt to rehabilitate the con-
ceptual, and thus rationalism, against the unreﬂ ective empiricism of most 
analytic philosophy. The systematicity he has managed to achieve in work-
ing out his new inferentialist doctrine has brought fascinating new currents 
to mainstream philosophy. But it has also dismayed a number of Brandom’s 
pragmatist peers, who feel that he has swung so far towards rationalism 
that he has landed in intellectualism. 1 Brandom’s analytic pragmatism has 
been charged with an ‘experience problem.’ For instance, Paul Redding has 
argued that Brandom fails to recognize the way in which by means of per-
ception we form beliefs  de re as well as  de dicto . Giving the example of 
himself wearing a blue tie, Redding claims that perceptual experience will 
most likely show the tie to be some  particular shade of blue which, although 
it can be more and more precisely described, can never be fully captured in 
concepts, and thus in propositional form: 
 Perceptual experience, it might be said, is more ﬁ ne-grained than what 
is actually captured by any general concept . . . this feature of perceptual 
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experience does not seem to be captured in the  de dicto expression: 
the semantics of a  de dicto expression depends simply on whether the 
proposition is true or false. The  way in which my tie makes the proposi-
tion true or false drops from consideration altogether. 
 (Redding 2014, 668) 
 In other words, perception seems to be a belief-forming mechanism char-
acterized by a kind of direct confrontation between mind and world which, 
in its felt immediacy and the bottomless determinacy of its detail, differs 
crucially from merely  understanding that the proposition “Paul Redding is 
wearing a blue tie” is true. 
 Admittedly, Brandom has tried to clear  some space in his epistemology 
for sense-experience. He acknowledges that for apparently simple pure 
qualia such as the color red, it seems counterintuitive to account for their 
meaning solely in terms of inferences licensed both ‘upstream’ (in proposi-
tions from which it follows that something is red) and ‘downstream’ (in 
propositions which follow from something being red). What would such 
inferences be? Didn’t Frank Jackson show us with his famous ‘Black and 
White Mary’ thought experiment ( Jackson 1982 ) that it is conceivable that 
a person might be able to license all valid red-related inferences, yet still 
not understand the true meaning of red—the unique and distinctive experi-
ence of seeing it? 2 For such concepts, then, Brandom makes an exception to 
his inferentialism, allowing their meaning to be at least partly speciﬁ ed by 
simple (i.e., mere stimulus-response) ‘reports’ on the part of relevant sensory 
mechanisms: in  Articulating Reasons , he calls this the color red’s “noninfer-
ential circumstances of appropriate application” (Brandom 2000, 21). This 
concession to qualia is what makes Brandom a  strong rather than a  hyper -
inferentialist. He describes himself as thereby offering a ‘two-ply’ theory of 
perception, which weaves together an experiential and an inferential strand, 
thereby showing itself: 
 The product of two distinguishable sorts of abilities: the capacity reli-
ably to discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli, and 
the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for 
reasons. 
 (Brandom 2002, 349) 
 But in order that his ﬁ rst ‘strand’ avoid the Myth of the Given, Brandom 
qualiﬁ es that “even such noninferential reports must be inferentially articu-
lated” (Brandom 2000, 47). This qualiﬁ cation is what makes Brandom a 
 strong rather than a  weak inferentialist. How can a noninferential report 
be inferentially articulated? Brandom gives the example of a culture where 
“white is the colour of death and things associated with death are to be 
shunned or avoided.” Here the concept white “can be understood to be 
inferential in a broad sense, even when the items connected are not them-
selves sentential” (Brandom 1994, 658). 
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 To sum up this section, sensory experience and conceptual understanding 
seem  prima facie quite different things. It would be difﬁ cult to deny that sen-
sory experience plays a vital role in perception—yet where the border exists 
between it and the conceptual, and how they manage to combine to produce 
thought, is still at this point rather mysterious. One way of posing these 
issues is as a discussion of so-called  nonconceptual content . If we admit that 
experience does play a vital role in perception, should we not then under-
stand perception as delivering nonconceptual as well as conceptual content? 
Lively debates on this matter currently abound in mainstream philosophy 
(e.g., Peacocke 1992,  1998 ; Bermúdez 1995;  Speaks 2005 ). 
 Here I wish to bring Charles Peirce to the table as I believe he has ideas to 
offer these characteristically ‘Pittsburgh School’ debates that are highly con-
genial, yet to date largely unexplored. In prior work I have situated Peirce 
with respect to Brandom’s inferentialism, arguing that Peirce is a hyper-
inferentialist due to his early (1860s) unequivocal rejection of  intuition in 
epistemology, claiming instead that all thought is in signs. I argued that 
Peirce works out an inferentialist account even of qualia such as red through 
naturalistic arguments which challenge the self-certainty of introspection, 
showing that we are not able to tell by intuition whether a thought is an 
intuition or an inference, and (what comes to the same thing) sketching a 
model of our sensory capacities in which many inferences occur below con-
scious awareness (Legg 2008). 
 In later papers (Legg 2014,  2017 ) I have begun to explore Peirce’s more 
mature commentary on these issues, in a full-ﬂ edged theory of perception 
that he presented around 1902. Here Peirce accords a more explicit and 
direct role to experience in an entirely preconceptual  percept , but this is 
overlaid with a level of  perceptual judgment which (I believe) corresponds 
to Sellars’s space of reasons. What is most interesting here is the relationship 
Peirce charts between percept and perceptual judgment: the latter does not 
describe , nor is it  justiﬁ ed by the former, rather, it  indexes it—how will be 
explained below. 
 As I have not yet related Peirce’s theory of perception speciﬁ cally to 
Sellars—who might justly be described as ‘inferentialism’s original fount’—
this is my task here. I will begin by explicating Sellars’s classic account of 
the Myth of the Given, and how to avoid it, in  Empiricism and Philosophy 
of Mind (henceforth:  EPM ). Then I will consider McDowell’s most recent 
( 2009 ) critique of Sellars’s account of perception, in order to sharpen our 
understanding. Then I will present Peirce’s mature theory of perception, and 
ﬁ nally relate it to Sellars’s view, thereby showing how Sellars is able to avoid 
McDowell’s critique of him. We will discover a remarkable amount in com-
mon between Sellars and Peirce on perception. This includes a  direct realism 
that is rare in modern philosophy, paired somewhat paradoxically with a 
crucial role played by diachronic  habit as against Cartesian ideals of immedi-
ate apprehension. (It will, moreover, be explained why the paradox is only 
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apparent.). These two features lead to an overall  critical common-sensist
account of rationality, which Sellars counterposes to the mainstream founda-
tionalism of his day, and which I shall argue is also very Peircean. But I shall 
begin by reviewing the famous Myth of the Given, and its dire warnings. 
 The Myth of the Given 
 The Myth of the Given has arguably itself attained somewhat mythical sta-
tus in certain philosophical circles as simultaneously deeply important not 
to commit, yet difﬁ cult to understand. But the underlying idea is relatively 
straightforward. Myth-makers purport to analyze “epistemic facts” into 
“non-epistemic facts” ( Sellars 1997 , §5, 19), which doesn’t work. 
 As noted, Sellars diagnoses the Myth as most pressingly a problem for 
classical empiricism. 3 Although the claim that all knowledge derives from 
 experience is deﬁ ning for empiricism, Sellars asserts that a crucial ambigu-
ity infects precisely that concept. By Sellars’s day, experience was frequently 
being referred to as  sense-data , and he adopts this terminology for purposes 
of critical scrutiny. Famously, he claims that the concept of sense-data con-
fuses two importantly different notions. The ﬁ rst is: “1) The idea that there 
are inner episodes—e.g., sensations of red . . . which can occur to human 
beings . . . without any prior process of learning or concept formation.” 
This is a purely causal notion of bodily impingement which accords, for 
instance, with Hume’s ofﬁ cial account of an  impression . The second notion 
is: “2) The idea that there are certain inner episodes which are . . . non-
inferential knowings that certain items are, for example red . . . and that 
these episodes are the necessary conditions of empirical knowledge as pro-
viding the evidence for all other empirical propositions” ( Sellars 1997 , §7, 
21–2). This is what Hume’s notion of an impression actually needs to be in 
order for it to play the role that Hume accords it in his epistemology. 
 Why is this confusion pernicious? First and foremost, it is intellectu-
ally dishonest. Sense-data notion 2) may be a basis for an epistemology—
although Sellars’s sympathies ultimately do not lie with this variety of foun-
dationalism ( Sellars 1997 , §38, 78), but it is not non-epistemic, as ‘know-
ings’ occur in it unreduced. Only sense-data notion 1) actually presents a 
non-epistemic analysans, but it is no proper basis for an epistemology. Sel-
lars’s argument for this is lengthy and subtle, but essentially he argues that 
sense-data so understood cannot play an appropriate  justiﬁ catory role with 
regard to our knowledge. It is simply not helpful to state that because X 
‘looks’ red to P, P is  justiﬁ ed in believing that X is red, and therefore (if X is 
indeed red) ‘P knows that X is red.’ 
 Sellars’s argument against this philosophical move carefully disentangles 
the way that ‘looks talk’ is actually used. Aided by a legendary thought-
experiment about a tie shop with confusing lighting, he notes that the state-
ment, ‘This tie  looks green’ only arises when it is known that surrounding 
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conditions are liable to make a tie appear green when it is  not really green
(e.g., if one takes the tie outside into sunlight). Otherwise, all parties 
involved in the situation will simply state, ‘This tie  is green.’ So, rather than 
the statement ‘X looks green’ routinely offering epistemic support for the 
knowledge ‘X is green,’ the statement is used precisely to signal an appear-
ance that one has reason to believe may well  differ from reality, due to: (i) 
extensive background knowledge of standard conditions for something to 
look the color that it is, (ii) knowledge that those conditions are not met in 
this case. And so, when it comes to epistemic priority, ‘X looks green’ is par-
asitic on ‘X is green,’ rather than the reverse ( Sellars 1997 , §18, 43). Such 
logical dependencies of color-concepts on extensive background knowledge 
of suitable conditions in which to view them are anathema to traditional 
empiricism’s logical atomism, according to which something’s ‘looking 
green’ might be the only thought one ever has ( Sellars 1997 , §19, 44). Lest 
it be argued that the particular contingent tie shop scenario is a very slen-
der reed to support the strong conclusion that claims of the form ‘X looks 
P’ are parasitic on claims of the form ‘X is P’ in  all circumstances, Sellars 
develops further strands to his argument. These include trying to imagine 
a community that uses ‘is talk’ but not ‘looks talk’—which he argues is 
conceivable—and trying to imagine a community that uses the latter but not 
the former—which he argues is not. 4 
 How does Sellars propose to avoid the Myth? He counterposes to his con-
temporaries’ unreﬂ ective empiricism a  rationalism that holds that there is no 
direct or intrinsic characterization of immediate experience ( Sellars 1997 , 
§25, 57). Nor is it right, he argues, to build a systematic account whereby 
immediate experience plays a ‘self-authenticating’ role for our knowledge. 
Rather than building our epistemology around the search for ideal prior 
conditions for knowledge-formation in the individual, we should under-
stand knowledge-formation as a group endeavor in which critical scrutiny 
can be applied by anyone, anywhere, at any time: 
 the correctness of a report does not have to be construed as the right-
ness of an  action . A report can be correct as being an instance of a 
general mode of behavior which, in a given linguistic community, it is 
reasonable to sanction and support. 
 ( Sellars 1997 , §35, 74) 
 Relatedly, 
 in characterizing an episode or state as that of knowing, we are not 
giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing 
it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify 
what one says. 
 ( Sellars 1997 , §36, 76) 
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 Yet isn’t it counterintuitive (so to speak!) to hold that there is no direct 
or intrinsic characterization of immediate experience? Sellars does not deny 
that sensations are  present , and that they play a  causal role in our perception: 
 One can certainly admit that the tie between ‘red’ and red physical 
objects . . . is causally mediated by sensations of red, without being 
committed to the mistaken idea that it is ‘really’ sensations of red, 
rather than red physical objects, which are the primary denotation of 
the word ‘red.’ 
 ( Sellars 1997 , §29, 64) 
 So is Sellars committed to nonconceptual content or not? We turn now to 
McDowell for further enlightenment. 
 McDowell on Sellars: Rational  Capacities Permeate Our 
Perception (But Not Rational  Judgments ) 
 We noted that in  Mind and World McDowell charges Sellars with an exces-
sively rationalist coherentism. In his 1997 Woodbridge lectures, published 
in 2009 as  Having the World in View , McDowell adopts a more nuanced 
evaluation of his great teacher. Much of this discussion departs from a cer-
tain statement that Sellars makes when rejecting foundationalism in episte-
mology as standardly construed. Sellars remarks that although he does not 
wish to say that empirical knowledge has  no foundation, the metaphor of 
‘foundation’ is misleading, because: 
 it keeps us from seeing that if there is a logical dimension in which other 
empirical propositions rest on observation reports, there is another logi-
cal dimension in which the latter rest on the former. 
 ( Sellars 1997 , §38, 78) 
 This second logical dimension, which runs  to observation statements  from 
other empirical propositions, was evident in the tie shop example, where the 
salesperson takes the tie outside in the sun and observes ‘This tie is blue’ not 
only because he is seeing blueness, but also because he knows that sunlight 
constitutes reliable conditions for detecting blueness. 
 In order to further explicate the two-way nature of this logical relation-
ship, McDowell develops the metaphor of a  line demarcating Sellars’s all-
important “logical space of reasons”: 
 Sellars’ thesis is that the conceptual apparatus we employ when we 
place things in the logical space of reasons is irreducible to any concep-
tual apparatus that does not serve to place things in the logical space of 
reasons. So the master thought [of  EPM ] as it were draws a line; above 
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the line are placings in the logical space of reasons, and below it are 
characterizations that do not do that. 
 ( McDowell 2009 , 5) 
 Now our question concerning whether there is any nonconceptual con-
tent can be put by asking: Does anything lie ‘below the line’ in Sellars’s 
account of perception? And if so, what role does it play? 
 McDowell begins by noting that Sellars seems to straightforwardly 
acknowledge some ‘below the line’ contribution to perception towards the 
end of  EPM (X onwards), where he vindicates a role for ‘inner episodes’ 
in order to distinguish himself from behaviorists such as Skinner. But what 
contribution, exactly, is made by these inner episodes? One might suppose 
that it is some kind of phenomenology that renders (for instance) my percep-
tion that Redding’s tie is blue characteristically  visual . But McDowell argues 
that the visual blueness of Redding’s tie occurs ‘above the line’ ( McDowell 
2009 , 14). What lies above the line is not “phenomenologically colourless.” 
So why posit anything below the line? We noted earlier that Sellars admits 
that “the tie between ‘red’ and red physical objects . . . is causally mediated 
by sensations of red.” McDowell considers the possibility that such pos-
ited sensations are needed to  scientiﬁ cally explain similarities between blue 
things and blue hallucinations ( McDowell 2009 , 15). But why should these 
‘below the line’ entities be understood as  sensations ? Why not go straight 
to a physiological story to explain blue hallucinations? McDowell remarks, 
“The sensations look like idle wheels” ( McDowell 2009 , 16). 
 McDowell goes on to suggest that in Sellars’s later work, sensations 
are posited as less of a scientiﬁ c explanation and more of a  transcenden-
tal argument establishing that our knowledge is objective through “having 
the world in view.” Sensations are “directed towards showing our entitle-
ment to conceive subjective occurrences as possessing objective purport” 
( McDowell 2009 , 17). In this view, sensations are not, to use Kantian lan-
guage, apperceived (i.e., ‘themselves visible’ in perception). Nevertheless it 
is helpful to say that they perform a “guiding function” for “the ﬂ ow of 
one’s conceptual representations” ( McDowell 2009 , 22). What does this 
mean? Using a probably too-crude illustration, one might say that when 
one directly perceives a cat, one experiences a ‘ﬂ ow of cat-related concepts’ 
(whiskers, tail, fur and so forth) which together fall into a certain overall 
‘shape’, which constitutes a non-concept-involving, and therefore below the 
line, impression of a cat. 
 Let us pause and note that what is described here might be understood as 
a form of  indexicality . This is an interesting thought which will be addressed 
again shortly. For McDowell, though, this Sellarsian ‘guiding’ and ‘shap-
ing’ which cannot be apperceived and is in principle unconceptualizable is 
just too mysterian and unhelpful. (He even claims that, ironically, it itself 
is redolent of the Myth of the Given.) He closes his volume with a chap-
ter designed to ﬁ nally sort out the Myth. Here he claims that “intuitional 
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content” is still conceptual (and thus above the line) although it is “not dis-
cursive content at all” ( McDowell 2009 , 270). The model for this is “having 
something in view”—for instance a red cube. 
 McDowell claims that having a red cube in view “is complete in itself” 
( McDowell 2009 , 270). It is not, as it stands, a judgment in propositional 
form (such as ‘This cube is red’). Nevertheless, it draws on ‘conceptual 
capacities’—our understanding of redness and cubehood, and to that extent 
it can be understood as having “judgment-shaped contents”  when viewed 
in the appropriate light— that is, by a language user from within their lan-
guage ( McDowell 2009 , 35). Yet at the same time as McDowell claims that 
the perception draws on conceptual capacities, he claims that the concepts 
themselves do not ‘ﬁ gure’ in the experience itself. He claims that if he and 
another person view a particular bird which McDowell knows to be a cardi-
nal and the other does not, it is not the case that the concept ‘cardinal’ fea-
tures in his perception and not the other person’s. As both persons have the 
same bird in view, their experience has the same intuitive content ( McDow-
ell 2009 , 259). 
 This complex, multimodal view is how McDowell explicates Kant’s 
difﬁ cult notion of an ‘intuition.’ He claims that this undermines Sellars’s 
transcendental argument which posits ‘manifolds of sheer receptivity’ 
(below the line) to secure objectivity in our knowledge by providing an 
‘external constraint’ on our thinking. McDowell claims that, by contrast, 
in his understanding of perception the only external constraint required is 
“ objects themselves . . . becoming immediately present” ( McDowell 2009 , 
39), along with whatever judgment-shaped properties users of relevant lan-
guages are able to recognize. To sum up, then, McDowell argues against 
Sellars that sense-experience and understanding are importantly different, 
and yet in perception  nothing occurs below the line and  there is no noncon-
ceptual content . 
 This determination has seemed to a number of philosophers to be disap-
pointingly  ad hoc in its separation ( albeit somewhat equivocal and confus-
ing) of perception from judgment, where one had hoped for an account 
which would explain the seamless continuity between them. What does it 
mean to claim that a perception is conceptual if it is not at all discursive? 5 If 
having a red cube in view does not in itself involve judging that the cube is 
red, how is it that we  do come to judge that the cube is red? 6 There is also 
arguably an opportunity missed here to develop a coordinated causal  and
rational account of the contribution of sensation to perception—which is 
precisely what we shall now explore. 
 Peirce’s Mature Theory of Perception 
 Interestingly, Peirce may also be understood as offering a ‘two-ply’ theory 
of perception. He also separates immediate experience, which he calls the 
percept , from truth-apt propositions derived from that experience, which 
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he calls the  perceptual judgment . Peirce’s realm of perceptual judgment thus 
corresponds nicely to Sellars’s space of reasons. Moreover, Peirce takes a 
position on the autonomy of the space of reasons which is very Sellarsian, 
while arguing against an antecedent of the empiricism of Carnap and Ayer 
which he ﬁ nds in the philosophy of John Venn: 
 Mr. Venn belongs to a school which considers the logical process as 
starting at the percepts, if not at impressions of sense. . . . But I maintain 
that logical criticism cannot go behind . . . the ﬁ rst judgments which we 
make concerning percepts. 
 (Peirce CP, 7.198) 
 Peirce’s stated reason for this claim, though, focuses less on the possibil-
ity of  justiﬁ cation than  criticism . He writes that criticism never pertains to 
a perception taken on its own, but only in juxtaposition with further facts, 
which requires that the whole be propositionally formulated in order to 
generate a  contradiction : 
 I look at an object and think that it seems white. That is my judgment of 
the object perceived . . . [it] does not, in itself, call for any explanation. 
On the contrary, it can only do that when it has been connected with 
other facts which taken by themselves would justify an expectation of 
the contrary of this fact. For example, if we should ﬁ nd that this object 
which seemed white, in the ﬁ rst place  was white, and then that it was a 
crow, and ﬁ nally that all the crows known were black. 
 (Peirce CP, 7.198) 
 Peirce notes that by contrast the  percept , as it is outside of the space of 
reasons, strictly cannot be described, in a manner interestingly reminiscent 
of Travis (2004): 
 I recognize that there is a percept or ﬂ ow of percepts very different 
from anything I can describe or think. What precisely that is I cannot 
even tell myself. . . . I am forced to content myself not with the ﬂ eeting 
percepts, but with the crude and possibly erroneous thoughts, or self-
informations, of what the percepts were. 
 (Peirce CP, 2.141) 
 The percept cannot be described as it is  singular . It “is a single event 
happening  hic et nunc ,” which “cannot be generalized without losing its 
essential character” (Peirce CP, 2.146). To put the same point another way, 
the percept cannot be described as it is  fully determinate . Peirce at one point 
likens the perceptual judgment to “the printed letters in a book, where a 
Madonna of Murillo is described,” and the percept to the exquisite picture 
itself (Peirce CP, 5.54). Here we see Peirce articulating Redding’s insight 
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that perception differs from mere  de dicto judgment in the ‘indescribable’ 
quantity of information it presents. (This similarity is not surprising since 
both thinkers share deep Kantian roots.) 
 At this point, though, one might wonder: why does Peirce’s percept 
not grievously recreate the Myth of the Given, 7 if it is some kind of non-
epistemic faculty that is posited at the root of all perception? But we shall 
see that the percept does not stand in a  justiﬁ catory relation to the percep-
tual judgment. So how do the percept and the perceptual judgment relate to 
one another, as they must if Peirce is to present a coherent theory of percep-
tion? Not in the way that might seem intuitively obvious—and the way that 
empiricism has traditionally supposed—according to which the perceptual 
judgment  describes or  copies the percept (as for instance British Empiricist 
Hume claimed that all our ideas form as copies of impressions). 8 Peirce also 
explains why the percept cannot  justify the perceptual judgment: as it is not 
in propositional form (not even close), it cannot serve as any kind of premise 
from which the perceptual judgment is concluded. Instead, Peirce claims, 
“there is no relation between the predicate of the perceptual judgment and 
the sensational element of the percept, except forceful connections” (Peirce 
CP, 7.634). In other words: the role of the perceptual judgement is solely to 
 index the percept . 9 This simply means that the percept  causes the perceptual 
judgment whilst not providing any of its content. 
 We earlier saw McDowell consider and reject the idea of positing some-
thing that performs a ‘guiding function’ for a ﬂ ow of conceptual represen-
tations in perception, while not being itself apperceived. Peirce’s percept 
performs precisely this role. So although the percept was aligned above with 
‘immediate experience,’ this should not be understood as immediate expe-
rience as  sense-data , but immediate experience as  direct contact with an 
object . Thus, this is a form of Reidian direct realism (which in contempo-
rary philosophy of perception is now frequently dubbed relationalism). 10 
 Perception is a process that takes place across time, though, and over time 
our constant  causal triggers from percept to perceptual judgment gradu-
ally become enmeshed in an ever more smooth and predictable network of 
 habits of association between certain kinds of percepts and certain kinds 
of perceptual judgments. How this occurs is best explicated in the broader 
framework of Peirce’s pragmatist theory of meaning, whereby belief consists 
in nothing but habits of expecting certain experiences in certain circum-
stances, and acting to bring about desired future experiences in that light. 
In short, our evolutionary legacy ensures that from birth our percepts pro-
duce “direct and uncontrollable interpretations” (Peirce CP, 7.648). These 
are trained, guided and corrected by our language-community until we 
produce perceptual  judgments that are appropriate to our circumstances. 
For this educative process, the nature of the percepts lying behind these 
judgments matters not, as only the latter are publically accessible to our 
teachers. 11 Crucially, this repetition of (noninferential) causal triggers until 
they become (inferential) habits of association is  how concepts are built in 
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Peirce’s philosophy. There is no other (dualist) ‘mind-stuff’ from which con-
cepts are made. 12 This is the great elegance of Peirce’s view, and its prospects 
for underpinning a thoroughly naturalistic philosophy of mind. 
 One further feature of Peirce’s account of how percept and perceptual 
judgment combine requires remarking on before I turn to Sellars. Despite 
their great difference from one another, the presence of stable habits of 
expectation and action enables the two to interlock in a process of mutual 
modiﬁ cation which is entirely two-way. Peirce puts it like this: 
 I have no means whatever of criticizing, correcting or recomparing [per-
cepts], except that I can collect new perceptual facts relating to new per-
cepts, and on that basis may infer that there must have been some error 
in the former reports, or on the other hand I may in this way persuade 
myself that the former reports were true. 
 (Peirce CP, 2.141) 
 This means that strictly speaking there is no way that the percept  is , in 
and of itself (or ‘in view’). The percept only exists as interpreted—and thus 
potentially reinterpreted—by the perceptual judgment: 13 
 Now let us take up the perceptual judgment ‘This wafer looks red.’ It 
takes some time to write this sentence, to utter it, or even to think it. It 
must refer to the state of the percept at the time that it, the judgment, 
began to be made. But the judgment does not exist until it is completely 
made. It thus only refers to a memory of the past; and all memory is 
possibly fallible and subject to criticism and control. The judgment, 
then, can only mean that so far as the character of the percept can ever 
be ascertained, it will be ascertained that the wafer looked red. 
 (Peirce CP, 5.544) 
 Here Peirce differs crucially from McDowell. We saw that McDowell 
claimed that where two people view a cardinal, one of whom has the con-
cept ‘cardinal’ and the other not, they can have the very same experience. 
In this sense, McDowell retains a preconceptual ‘space of experience,’ but 
for Peirce there is no such space. In that sense McDowell’s ‘line’ metaphor 
is potentially misleading: more on this as follows. 
 Sellars Viewed in the Light of Peirce 
 Peirce’s Reidean  direct realism , which captures the  de re dimension of per-
ception highlighted by Redding, is arguably the best way of making sense 
of what Sellars means when he speaks in  EPM of sensations performing a 
‘guiding function’ for a ﬂ ow of conceptual representations while not them-
selves being apperceived. In a later extended discussion of phenomenalism, 
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Sellars is even more explicit about this. In a section entitled “Direct Realism: 
Causal vs Epistemic Mediation,” he writes: 
 the direct perception of physical objects is mediated by the occurrence 
of sense impressions which latter are, in themselves, thoroughly non-
cognitive. Furthermore, this mediation is causal rather than epistemic. 
Sense impressions do not mediate by virtue of being known. 
 ( Sellars 1963 , 91) 
 Ironically this kind of direct realism sounds a great deal like how McDow-
ell says he wants to understand “having the world in view”—solely as 
“ objects themselves . . . becoming immediately present” ( McDowell 2009 , 
39). How McDowell managed to reject Sellars’s proffered indexicality by 
confusing it with a kind of transcendental phenomenology is difﬁ cult to 
understand. 14 I would guess that a signiﬁ cant role is here played by a cer-
tain ambiguity in the technical philosophical term  impression : between an 
‘experience’ (phenomenological) of a sensation and an ‘experience’ (transac-
tional or indexical) of an object. 15 Sellars is arguably thinking of the latter, 
yet McDowell cannot help reading the former. This ambiguity—and the 
resulting confusion generated in philosophy—goes back to the early modern 
philosophy’s ‘veil of ideas’ 16 —indeed is arguably created by it. 
 Sellars also echoes Peirce’s focus on  habit . He shows keen awareness of 
a diachronic dimension to perception, and makes it crucial to his attack on 
the Myth of the Given, when he criticizes classical empiricists as follows: 
 they have taken givennness to be a fact that presupposes no learn-
ing, no forming of associations, no setting up of stimulus-response 
connections. 
 ( Sellars 1997 , §6, 20) 
 A third point of conﬂ uence between Sellars and Peirce arguably consists 
in some form of  critical-common-sensism . In the discussion of phenomenal-
ism cited above, Sellars not only claimed that the mediation of perception 
by sensations is causal not epistemic, he also claimed that realizing this con-
stitutes a crucial step “towards an adequately critical direct realism” ( Sel-
lars 1963 , 90). 17 Why? I would suggest, precisely to capture the  two-way
correction between percept and perceptual judgment we saw Peirce elabo-
rating earlier. Ironically, by removing sensory experiences from the role of 
justifying our judgments, and rendering them instead preconceptual indices 
to a world independent of our minds, they become a much more powerful 
scaffold for self-correction as we go about our business of trying to know 
reality. This, I think, is the essence of the account of rationality that Sellars 
puts forward against the foundationalism that is still widely pervasive in 
mainstream philosophy: 
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 Empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is ratio-
nal, not because it has a foundation, but because it is a self-correcting 
enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once. 
 ( Sellars 1997 , §38, 79) 
 With so much commonality now established between Sellars and Peirce, 
it is worth considering whether there are any important differences. One 
feature of Sellars’s thought that comes instantly to mind is his  psychological 
nominalism , whereas Peirce famously vows to oppose nominalism in all its 
forms. Yet Sellars deﬁ nes psychological nominalism as the view that, “all 
awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts etc. . . . is a linguistic affair” ( Sellars 
1997 , §29, 63)—in other words, general properties consist in ‘mere words’ 
(and their uses). In an interesting sense of this claim, I don’t think that Peirce 
would disagree. 18 I hope to investigate this matter more fully in a future 
study. A second potential major disagreement concerns the ‘naturalizing of 
normativity.’ We have noted that Peirce presents an elegant platform for 
this in holding that concepts, with their rich network of normative forces, 
are formed through the repetition of (noninferential) causal triggers until 
they become (inferential) habits of association. Sellars, on the other hand, 
famously separates the world’s normative  manifest image from a  scientiﬁ c 
image that he envisages to be purely descriptive. Yet whether such a separa-
tion is what Sellars most wants, or rather all that he feels he is able to have 
given the state of development of his own philosophy, is an interesting ques-
tion. 19 Although the separation is reinforced in McDowell’s strong dualism 
between ‘ﬁ rst’ and ‘second’ nature, and Brandom’s Hegelian counterpos-
ing of  Natur and  Geist , the fact that there is an ongoing dispute between 
this ‘left-wing’ camp of Sellars adherents, and ‘right-wingers’ such as Ruth 
Milikan and the Churchlands who emphasize Sellars’s unﬂ inching scientiﬁ c 
realism, suggests that possibilities lie germinal in Sellars’s texts for a more 
thoroughgoing and integrated naturalism. 
 Conclusion 
 The fact that we are beings who perceive means that our thinking is con-
strained by a world which, to the degree that it constrains us, it makes sense 
to describe as ‘external.’ As philosophers, it is tempting to wonder at what 
point in our encounter with this world are concepts ‘put onto’ what we 
experience? But we have now learned that just because preconceptual expe-
rience  is part of the explanatory story of perception, doesn’t mean it should 
be reiﬁ ed into a discrete  component of perception (that is itself apperceived). 
Just this insight arguably constitutes a signiﬁ cant step forward from main-
stream empiricism, and much current debate around the existence or oth-
erwise of ‘nonconceptual content.’ Yet arguably all the Pittsburgh School 
players largely agree on this point—so what is the difference between them? 
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 We’ve seen that Brandom holds a two-ply theory of perception according 
to which we apperceive not only concepts whose meaning is fully inferen-
tial, but also noninferential (mere stimulus-response) sensory ‘reports.’ In 
this way, unlike Peirce, he attempts to put both strands ‘above the line.’ But 
by assigning such sensory reports their own,  sui generis , explicitly nonin-
ferential category within the semantic space he arguably compromises his 
inferentialism. 
 By contrast, McDowell claims that perception is conceptual through 
and through, and to that degree arguably manages to achieve a hyper-
inferentialism. Yet he feels obliged to draw a distinction between ‘intuitional’ 
and ‘discursive’ content, in order to postulate (in the form of intuitional 
content) a brute synchronic encounter between mind and world—a ‘having 
the world in view’—as the basis for all our knowledge, just as Kant taught. 
In one of the many ironic twists and turns which characterize these debates, 
I would claim that this posited brute synchronic encounter resembles suf-
ﬁ ciently what Sellars called a “direct or intrinsic characterization of immedi-
ate experience” ( Sellars 1997 , §25, 57) to constitute yet another face of the 
Myth of the Given. 
 I would like to venture the same point in another way, as follows. Inferen-
tialism should mean more than just that concepts are somehow present (‘sit-
ting there’!) in perception. (Is the concept  cardinal ‘in’ one’s perception of a 
cardinal, or is it not?) Please forgive me for remarking that that seems a very 
representationalist view of the inferential. Let us recall that concepts are the 
basic ingredients not of physical space but of a space of  reasons . As such, 
their role—the whole point of their presence, if you will—is  to reason : to be 
always poised to correct and reinterpret any previous thoughts, according 
to the logical relationships between them. So to the extent that McDowell is 
able to think thoughts about the cardinal  qua cardinal that his companion is 
not, his perception of it is not the same. This essentially dynamic quality of 
the conceptual is, I would argue, the vital insight that classical pragmatism 
can bring to these debates. 20 
 To sum up McDowell, then, his fundamental claim that he sees as distin-
guishing himself from Sellars—that in perception ‘intuitional content’ lies 
‘above the line’—is a mixture of incorrect and misconceived. First, if we 
understand intuition not as qualitative and (in that sense) phenomenologi-
cal, but as indexical, and indexicality as preconceptual (as I have argued 
that we should), then we must see ‘intuitional content’ as a contradiction in 
terms. Second—and even more profoundly—we must cast a critical eye on 
‘the line.’ This metaphor was used by Sellars himself, and is in some ways 
extremely helpful in enabling us to discuss what can be part of a space of 
reasons and what can not. Yet at the same time it is arguably not helpful 
insofar as it suggests that there might be a space ‘containing’ reasons, and a 
space ‘containing’ only something else. The connection between the concep-
tual and the indexical in our thinking is much more intimate than that. 21 In 
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fact, in Peirce’s thought we have seen how it is possible to explain concepts 
as themselves created from congeries of indices that are sufﬁ ciently repeti-
tious to fall into intelligible patterns. 
 We have seen that both Sellars and Peirce managed to combine both a 
rare direct realism and a diachronic account of perception such that there is 
no direct or intrinsic characterization of experience—all perception is inter-
pretative. The combination of these two claims has frequently been viewed 
as contradictory. But it is not. As Haack clearly explains: 
 Perception is interpretative. But it is neither necessary nor desirable to 
take this to mean that perception is not of things and events around us, 
but of images. . . . It is both possible and plausible to take it as meaning, 
rather, that though perception is of the things around us, our perceptual 
beliefs involve explanatory ﬁ lling-in of the often limited information 
afforded us by our perceptual interactions with those things. 
 ( Haack 1994 , 32) 22
 Seeing astutely through this apparent paradox enabled Sellars to replace 
foundationalism with a critical common-sensism still largely untried in 
mainstream epistemology. But although Sellars was a devastating critic of 
the dominant empiricism of his day, his positive account is arguably not as 
clearly or thoroughly worked out as Peirce’s account of meaning in terms of 
habit, embedded in a broader pragmatist theory of meaning (which was in 
turn embedded in an ambitious general theory of signs, but that is another 
story)—to show how hyper-inferentialism can be operationalized. 
 Notes 
 1  See, for instance, Koopman (2007), Levine (2012). A related critique, though 
not from a self-avowed pragmatist, is McDowell (2005). 
 2  For this point I am grateful to Dave Beisecker. 
 3  Although intriguingly he suggests that it is also a problem for a putatively later 
Wittgensteinian understanding of language in terms of rule-following that is trig-
gered by circumstances of rule-application that are themselves understood to be 
‘given’ (Sellars 1997, §30, 64–5). 
 4  I am grateful to Yuri Cath for pressing me on this point. 
 5  It should be noted that Paul Redding makes an interesting attempt to explicate 
this in terms of Hegel’s distinctive theory of judgment in Redding (2017). 
 6  For me, the matter is not fully clariﬁ ed by McDowell claiming that when he 
judges that there is a red cube in front of him, “a conceptual capacity corre-
sponding to ‘red’ and a conceptual capacity corresponding to ‘cube’ have to 
be exercised with a togetherness corresponding to the togetherness of ‘red’ and 
‘cube’; in ‘There is a red cube in front of me’,” and that this provides, “a partial 
speciﬁ cation of the function that gives unity to the various representations in an 
ostensible seeing that there is a red cube in front of me” (McDowell 2009, 31). 
What exactly is this ‘function’? Which part of it is here being speciﬁ ed? And 
what is the other part? 
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 7  For ﬁ rst raising this point to me in 2014, and for other comments which 
improved this paper, I am grateful to Willem DeVries. 
 8  Could the relationship be rightly viewed as a ‘noninferential report’, in Bran-
dom’s sense? In my view this is an interesting question, worthy of a separate 
study. 
 9  One of the ﬁ rst Peirce scholars to clearly highlight this key point was Susan 
Haack—see, for instance, Haack (1994). 
 10  For an interesting recent paper tracing links between these debates, see Sant’Anna 
(forthcoming). 
 11  In this regard Forman (2007) gives a nice account of how although McDowell 
dismisses sensations as ‘idle wheels’ for explaining concurrent perception of an 
object, he misses the way in which they form a necessary condition for acquiring 
empirical concepts in the ﬁ rst place. 
 12  For a brilliant unpicking of how this works, and some of its profound conse-
quences for philosophy of mind and epistemology, see Massecar (2012). 
 13  This point is extremely well explicated in (Rosenthal 2001). Similar revisionary 
potential has been posited in human agency, whereby narrativity confers upon 
our actions a ‘trajectory-dependent property.’ For instance if X happens, then it 
is true that I was in love with M at a given time, whereas if Y happens, it is false 
(Jones 2008, 271–5). Given that Peirce’s is a pragmatist theory of perception, 
this convergence is arguably no coincidence. 
 14  As I understand it, essentially the same point is made in DeVries (2006). See also 
DeVries and Coates (2009), Macbeth (2009). 
 15  Levine puts the same point well by stating that in Sellars’s view, “the cues that 
sensation provides are structural instead of qualitative” (Levine 2007, 65). Inter-
estingly, this structural dimension to sensory causes arguably bestows on them 
an  iconic , over and above the  indexical function that has been the focus of this 
paper. I thank Vera Saller for pointing this out to me. It is difﬁ cult to say much 
explicitly about this iconicity as the percept is so inarticulable, but once again 
resonances with Sellars appear in that he famously (somewhat controversially) 
talked of ‘picturing’— albeit between tokens of linguistic expressions and the 
world (and thus ‘above the line’). 
 16  This ambiguity was noted in the last section where it was remarked that ‘imme-
diate experience’ may be understood both as ‘sense-data’  and as ‘direct contact 
with an object.’ 
 17  See also Sellars (1982). 
 18  For instance, Peirce writes, “the external world . . . does not consist of existent 
objects merely, nor merely of these and their reactions; but on the contrary, its 
most important reals have the mode of being of what the nominalist calls ‘mere’ 
words, that is, general types and would—bes. The nominalist is right in say-
ing that they are substantially of the nature of words; but his ‘mere’ reveals a 
complete misunderstanding of what our everyday world consists of” (Peirce CP, 
8.191). 
 19  Explored to some degree in (Olen 2016). 
 20  I endeavored to argue this in more depth at the end of Legg (2017). 
 21  At some points in  Having the World in View McDowell does gesture towards 
understanding this, e.g., in Chapter 2, “The Logical Form of an Intuition,” but 
I would argue that he doesn’t thoroughly integrate it. 
 22  Levine (2007) also ably defends the compatibility of these two positions, with 
speciﬁ c reference to Sellars’s philosophy of perception, although I take issue 
with his interpretation of Sellars’s sensations as able to be ‘led into’ the space of 
reasons. 
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